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Newport, R.I.**

**Operational Command and Control for Stability Operations:  
A Civilian Deputy to the Military Operational Commander**

**by**

**Jason K. Brandt**

**Commander, U.S. Navy**

**A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.**

**The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.**

**Signature: \_\_\_\_\_**

**27 October 2010**

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## **Abstract**

Achieving unity of effort across the whole of government for stability operations is a complex problem that must be solved to avoid repeating the failures of the early stages of Operation Iraqi Freedom. While National Security Presidential Directive – 44 (NSPD-44) effectively addressed interagency coordination at the national level and set the course to address the lack of civilian resources necessary for stability operations, it failed to establish a baseline command and control model at the operational level for stability operations in a hostile environment. Instead, NSPD 44 stated that “supported/supporting relationships will be determined”. This paper analyzes historical case studies of U.S. stability operations during World War II, Vietnam, and Operation Iraqi Freedom and critiques possible operational level command and control models to identify the most effective. It concludes that that unity of effort across government institutions is required at the operational level to plan and execute the transition from combat to post-combat operations and can best be achieved with a civilian deputy to the military operational commander. The civilian deputy should lead a hybrid civilian-military organization in the planning and execution of stability operations and synchronize efforts with combat forces. Finally, recommendations are made on how to institute this operational command and control model as U.S. policy.

*The United States has a significant stake in enhancing the capacity to assist in stabilizing and reconstructing countries or regions, especially those at risk or, in, or in transition from conflict or civil strife...to prevent those territories from being used as a base of operations or safe haven for extremists, terrorists, organized crime groups, or others who post a threat to U.S. foreign policy, security, or economic interests.*

– National Security Presidential Directive – 44, 7 December 2005

The terrorist events of 9-11 changed the way the U.S. views stability operations. The National Security Strategy of 2006 and now 2010 no longer list any single nation state as the gravest threat to national security, instead it identifies terrorist organizations that could find refuge in weak or failed states.<sup>1</sup> Thus, stability operations to fix these failed states is now a critical mission to both military and civilian, leaders and planners. The U.S. Government's difficulty in planning and executing the transition from combat to stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan highlighted poor interagency cooperation. Achieving unity of effort across the whole of government for stability operations is a complex problem that the U.S. Government must solve in order to avoid repeating the failures of the early stages of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).

Since the initial failures of OIF, the U.S. Government made significant progress in improving interagency coordination for stability operations; however, U.S. policy has not settled on a baseline operational command and control model to plan and execute stability operations in a hostile environment. Instead, each situation is to be handled on a case-by-case basis. Unity of effort across all government institutions is necessary at the operational level to plan and execute the transition from combat to post-combat operations and can best be achieved with a civilian deputy to the military operational commander. A civilian deputy will bring expertise that can facilitate the integration of the capabilities resident across all organization involved in stability operations.

This paper will first briefly overview the U.S. Government policy for stability operations. Following will be an examination of three historical case studies which portray different command and control models to plan and execute stability operations: U.S. occupation of Nazi Germany, the Vietnam War, and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Finally, these models will be analyzed and critiqued, followed by an overall recommendation on the optimal operational command and control for stability operations.

### **U.S. Policy for stability operations**

Problems with interagency coordination during the planning and execution of stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan demanded corrections to U.S. policy. These problems are widely recognized and have been the basis for books like *Fiasco* and many others.<sup>2</sup> The principle obstacles in achieving a whole of government approach are the lack of a common understanding of the nature of stability operations, the lack of resources necessary for their success, and poor interagency coordination at national and operational levels.

Within two years of the start of OIF, a common understanding was established across military and civilian institutions on the nature of stability operations, and its subset counterinsurgency. This common understanding is reflected in several publications: *US Government Counterinsurgency Guide*, *U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-24 / U.S. Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5 Counterinsurgency*, *Joint Publication 3-07 Stability Operations*, and *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction*. The later is “The first strategic „doctrine” ever produced for civilians engaged in peacebuilding missions.”<sup>3</sup>

All of these publications share a common understanding that stability operations consist of actions to address security, political, economic, social, and justice dimensions. For example, Joint Publication 3-07 defines stability operations as:

An overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.<sup>4</sup>

This broad array of action is preponderantly civilian in nature, not military. Actions across these dimensions are interdependent and therefore must be conducted simultaneously rather than sequentially. The military contributes to stability operations by providing security.

Security is the enabler to action in all other areas – without it, civilians are not safe to carryout their actions. Stability operations may take place in secure or hostile environments in states at risk of, in, or in transition from, conflict. A hostile environment may prevent civilians from participating in stability operations and means that the military must be ready to act across all dimensions in their stead. Lastly, it is widely acknowledged that while unity of effort is important, unity of command is difficult to achieve. Therefore, in place of unity of command, these publications suggest that unity of effort be achieved through cooperation.<sup>5</sup>

U.S. policy for stabilization operations is articulated in National Security Presidential Directive - 44 (NSPD-44) issued on 7 December 2005. NSPD-44 sets the course for developing civilian capability for stability operations<sup>6</sup>, assigned national level leadership for stability operations to the Secretary of State, and created the State Department Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) to act as the Secretary's executive agent. The NSPD requires the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and other U.S. departments coordinate to harmonize plans.<sup>7</sup> This effectively solved the problem of interagency coordination at the national level and set the course to solve the lack of civilian resources necessary for stability operations.

With regard to the baseline command and control model to use at the operational level for stability operations in a hostile environment, NSPD-44 states:

The Secretary of State shall coordinate and lead integrated United States Government efforts, involving all U.S. Departments and Agencies with relevant capabilities, to prepare, plan for, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities...The Secretaries of State and Defense will integrate stabilization and reconstruction contingency plans with military contingency plans when relevant and appropriate. The Secretaries of State and Defense will develop a general framework for fully coordinating stabilization and reconstruction activities and military operations at all levels where appropriate. Within the scope of this NSPD, and in order to maintain clear accountability and responsibility for any given contingency response or stabilization and reconstruction mission, lead and supporting responsibilities for agencies and departments will be designated using the mechanism outlined in NSPD-1. These lead and supporting relationships will be re-designated as transitions are required.<sup>8</sup>

The NSPD-44 fails to adequately address the challenge of producing unity of effort at the operational level. It calls for integrated planning, but not an integrated operational command and control model. It relies on cooperation between the State Department, the Defense Department and other U.S. agencies on a case-by-case establishment – similar to supported and supporting relationships. The NSPD fails to establish a baseline command and control model for the most difficult and dangerous endeavor: the planning of major military combat operations with follow-on stability operations. It is a positive step that military and civilian agencies are required to “harmonize” plans and conduct war games together, but how can planning and war gaming be effective if command and control relationships are not clearly established? Geographical Combatant Commanders (GCCDR) are constantly developing and refining Operational Concepts and Operational Plans. These are complex plans requiring months or years to develop. Delaying the decision on supported/supporting agencies and command and control in the name of “cooperation” is detrimental to the success of Phase 3, Phase 4, and the transition between them.



## **Historical Case Studies**

History is an excellent teacher. The challenges facing the U.S. Government today concerning the selection of a command and control model to achieve unity of effort across its institutions for stability operations are not new. The U.S. occupation of Nazi Germany demonstrates the reluctance of the President to assign to the military the lead in stabilization operations, and the subsequent effectiveness of military unity of command with an operational deputy. During the Vietnam War, institutional gridlock caused the President to order the consolidation of all civilian stability operations under the control of a single Ambassadorial ranked civilian who acted as a deputy to the military operational commander. Stability operations for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) suffered from disjointed planning and the establishment of both a military and civilian operational headquarters with unclear supported/supporting relationship. These three case studies illustrate how important unity of command is to producing unity of effort at the operational level in a hostile environment.

### **U.S. Occupation of Nazi Germany**

In May 1942, a fierce debate emerged over which U.S. agency should plan and execute governance of occupied territories. Ultimately, only the military had the capability to accomplish the task. Planning for the post-conflict occupation of Germany was carried out by the staff of the operational commander, initially executed by all of his subordinate commanders, and later executed by one of his operational deputies who had been appointed by the President. This military only and unified command and control structure was highly effective in the occupation of Germany, what today would be called stability operations.

The debate over which U.S. agency should govern occupied territories pit ideology against practical realities. The civilian agencies made the argument that governance was a

civilian task, and that military government was imperialistic. The War Department argued that unity of command was essential to success, and that only the military had the resources to plan and execute occupation duties. It was not a mission that military leaders wanted, but they expected to be tasked with administering occupation due to the practical realities of the military's capabilities compared to other agencies. President Roosevelt agreed that the military should not be the lead agency. For Operation Torch, the November 1942 invasion of North Africa, he put the State Department in charge of administering occupied territories.<sup>9</sup>

Efforts in North Africa by the State Department proved to be a disaster. Ultimately, Secretary of State Hull admitted that a radical reorganization of the State Department would be required before it could take on occupation duties. In November 1943, due to the practical realities that no other agency had the capability to plan and execute the post-conflict occupation, the President reassigned the task to the War Department.<sup>10</sup>

The scale and complexity of occupying Germany required years of preparation and planning by the military. The Army's School of Military Government was established in May 1942 and trained 6000 officers in a twelve-week course over the next three years<sup>11</sup>. The Civil Affairs Division was established in March 1943 under the Secretary of War to support planning<sup>12</sup>, and operational planning for the occupation of Germany was initiated on 22 May 1943 by Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander (COSSAC). Political leadership did not provide formal policy for post-war Germany until almost a year later, in April 1944, and post-war policy continued to be refined up through the Yalta Conference in February 1945.<sup>13</sup> Throughout this period, the military continued planning despite the lack of political guidance as a matter of impending necessity and as a means to stimulate policy decisions.<sup>14</sup>

Occupation operations overlapped with combat operations and were carried out by all commanders with the advice of civil affairs officers. Combat forces were guided in carrying out post-conflict operations in the territories they conquered by the detailed plan for the occupation of Germany, Operation Plan Eclipse. Eclipse encompassed all aspects of governance and administration including “surrender procedures, labor policies, procedures for handling Allied prisoners of war and United Nations displaced civilians, mechanisms for disarming the German armed forces, and guidance for establishing military government.”<sup>15</sup>

The operational commander was responsible for occupation operations and later delegated execution to his presidentially appointed deputy. General Eisenhower as commander of Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) was tasked by the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) in April 1944 with authority and responsibility for governing occupied Germany.<sup>16</sup> Then, in April 1945 General Lucius Clay was appointed by the President to be the military governor of Germany and deputy to General Eisenhower.<sup>17</sup> In May 1945, Germany surrendered. This command and control structure maintained unity of command for both combat and post-combat operations under General Eisenhower and afforded focused execution of occupation by General Clay, an officer specifically trained in civil affairs.

Under military governance, Germany was successfully administered and rebuilt into a country that would no longer endanger peace. General Clay led all aspects of the execution of Eclipse, and subsequent policy directives, for four years before transitioning Germany to U.S. civilian control. U.S. occupation forces began with a Germany that was in complete ruins and its population exhausted. Under General Clay’s leadership and with U.S. Government funding, the military ensured adequate food to prevent a humanitarian disaster,

completed de-Nazification, prevented the formation of a Nazi resistance movement, and rebuilt the German police forces, legal system, economy, and government.<sup>18</sup>

The principle lessons from the all-military occupation and reconstruction of Germany are that stability operations are a momentous and complex task requiring unity of effort. The military is often the only organization capable of carrying out this mission. Detailed planning can take years, requires skilled manpower, the ability to integrate with combat plans, and may often need to start in the absence of post-war policy from political leadership. Successful execution requires a detailed plan, unity of effort across all areas, and forces that can take action across security, legal, economic, social, and governance areas. The command and control model of a single military operational commander across both combat and post-combat operations and a deputy focused on stability operations is proven to be effective.

### **Vietnam War and the CORDS Program**

In 1966, after twelve years of involvement with the Vietnam War, the U.S. was still failing to achieve success in counterinsurgency. Although national policy called for a focus on pacification/counterinsurgency, that policy had yet to be turned into synchronized action at the operational level. According to a counterinsurgency expert, Douglas Blaufarb:

Each agency had its own ideas on what had to be done, its own communications channels with Washington, its own personnel and administrative structure - - and starting in 1964-65, each agency began to have its own field personnel operating under separate and parallel chains of command. This latter event was ultimately to prove the one which gave reorganization efforts such force, since it began to become clear to people in Washington and Saigon alike that the Americans in the provinces were not always working on the same team, and that they were receiving conflicting and overlapping instruction from a variety of sources in Saigon and Washington.<sup>19</sup>

The source of the problem was institutional inertia that prevented the development of unique solutions to a unique threat. Institutions preferred to keep doing what they were used to doing, using their same peacetime structure and processes. This was in opposition to the

North Vietnam Communist threat that was highly synchronized politically, diplomatically, economically, and militarily.<sup>20</sup>

The lack of success in counterinsurgency and the inability of institutions to coordinate at the operational level called for Presidential intervention. On 28 March 1966, President Johnson appointed Robert Komer as his Special Assistant with the task to be the “specific focal point for the direction, coordination, and supervision in Washington of U.S. non-military programs relating to Vietnam.”<sup>21</sup> After Mr. Komer created the Civil Operations Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program that included both civilian and military pacification efforts, the President sent him to Vietnam to lead this organization. Mr. Komer was granted four-star ambassadorial rank and made an operational deputy to General Westmoreland, commander of Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV). While parent institutions continued to provide financial and administrative support to their field offices, Ambassador Komer controlled the planning and execution of all field operations related to counterinsurgency.<sup>22</sup> Ambassador Komer’s rank, positional authority under General Westmoreland, and Presidential mandate enabled him to plan and execute stability operations at the operational level that were synchronized with the regular military forces.

The CORDS organization was unique in U.S. history as it was a hybrid organization mixing military and civilians at every level. Below Ambassador Komer’s operational staff were subordinate commands in each of the four regions, 44 provinces, and 234 districts conducting operations in over 10,000 hamlets. Due to the hostile security environment, the lower levels were staffed predominantly with military.<sup>23</sup> Ambassador Komer controlled personal incentives as he had the power to write individual performance reports on the military and civilians under him.<sup>24</sup> Ironically, “subordinating civilian capabilities to the

military chain of command actually realized the principle of the primacy of civil power. This unique placement gave civilian entities greater influence than they ever had before because it provided resources they did not previously have.”<sup>25</sup> Relative to the conventional military, the budget for CORDS was small, accounting for only three percent of the annual shooting war’s budget of \$30 billion per year.<sup>26</sup>

Komer led CORDS to success at the operational level with a series of operations. First he bolstered local paramilitary forces with new weapons and equipment. These forces provided the local protection necessary to carryout civilian development programs. Alongside development programs were direct action programs aimed at identifying and eradicating local Viet Kong cadre. Komer took risk and capitalized on the Viet Kong losses during the TET offensive by decreasing the size of each paramilitary team to create more teams in order to push them into previous Viet Kong strongholds.<sup>27</sup> The result was that “by 1970 a considerable measure of security had been restored and the ability of the insurgency to affect events, to mobilize the population, to fight, tax, and recruit had been eroded to the point where it was a manageable threat.”<sup>28</sup> Regrettably, CORDS’s success was too late in coming to affect the outcome of the Vietnam War.

CORDS was a unique organization created by the act of the President himself in order to overcome the institutional inertia which was preventing unity of effort at the operational level. The success of the CORDS program shows that civilians can thrive in a hybrid civil-military organization, that unity of command rapidly produces unity of effort, and that stabilization operations are more apt to be successful under a leader and organization with a vested responsibility and authority to control field operations across the interagency.

CORDS demonstrates that the command and control model of a civilian deputy to the military operational commander is highly effective for stability operations.

### **Operation Iraqi Freedom**

The planning and execution of stability operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) struggled to achieve unity of effort. Throughout this major operation there were two headquarters, one military and one civilian. The names, structure, and leaders of both of these headquarters changed several times throughout the operation and their relationship to each other was never clear. It was not clear if the first common superior for military and civilian leaders in Iraq was the Secretary of Defense or the President.<sup>29</sup> The lack of unity of command at the operational level meant that unity of effort depended on the personal relationships between the leaders of the civilian and military headquarters. Difficulties in execution were compounded by unexpected sectarian violence and an armed insurgency that continues today.

Tasking to plan Phase IV initially fell within CENTCOM and then transitioned to an external office outside of the control of the operational commander. The CENTCOM Commander, General Franks, first assigned planning for Phase IV to a one star general. Three months prior to hostilities commencing, planning responsibility for Phase IV shifted to then shifted to the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) that reported to Department of Defense (DOD). Led by LtGen(Ret) Jay Garner, ORHA had little time to plan and its staff lacked diplomatic and Middle East area expertise.<sup>30</sup>

After U.S. victory against Saddam Hussein's military, the command and control structures changed again. ORHA was only in country for one month before the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), under Ambassador Paul Bremer III, took over with a mandate

to govern Iraq for an indefinite period. Around the same time, General Franks departed and a new military headquarters was established in Combined Task Force-7 under LtGen Ricardo Sanchez. The relationship between CPA and CTF-7 was not clear and coordinating to achieve unity of effort was difficult.<sup>31</sup> Later Ambassadors and military leaders developed close cooperation to help create unity of effort.<sup>32</sup> After the transition of control of all Provisional Reconstruction Teams (PRT) to the Department of State, some PRTs reported receiving no useful direction from the operational level and that PRT actions with military brigades were not synchronized.<sup>33</sup> The lack of unity of command across civilian and military forces engaged in stability operations in Iraq made unity of effort difficult to achieve.

Inadequate planning, poor interagency cooperation, and the lack of unity of command at the operational level resulted in both the military and civilian headquarters being unprepared for Phase IV stability operations. Insufficient planning resulted in soldiers on the ground not understanding what action to take once Phase IV began.<sup>34</sup> Although coordination improved, it was only due to personal commitments to cooperation by transitory military and civilian leaders and not from a lasting command and control model. Poor performance in OIF caused by poor interagency coordination spurred Presidential attention and resulted in NSPD-44 aimed at fixing this glaring problem.

### **Command and Control Options for Stability Operations**

There are five possible command and control options to address the question of how to best coordinate civilian and military efforts at the operational level for stability operations in a hostile environment. These options can be summarized as (1) military only, (2) civilian only, (3) parallel military and civilian, (4) integrated with military lead, and (5) integrated with civilian lead.



The military only option requires the military to have the capability and capacity to perform a broad array of diplomatic, economic, justice, social, and developmental functions necessary for stability operations in addition to its combat skills. An increase in the required skill sets for the military would necessitate either a decrease in the time spent developing its combat skills or the addition of forces possessing these skills. In the occupation of Nazi Germany, the U.S. Army took three years to develop its civil affairs corps. Today, a Reserve Force could be used to surge civil affairs capabilities in times of need while a core of active duty civil affairs officers could carry out planning. In this manner, an array of doctors, lawyers, local government officials, city planners, engineers, and social workers would don a uniform and augment the military to carry out stability operations. This option is not practical today because it is duplicative of the State Department's planned Response Readiness Corps and Civilian Reserve Corps, would divert an extraordinary amount of defense dollars from combat capabilities towards stability operations capabilities, and within the military culture would likely remain in second place next to combat forces.

The civilian only option means that civilian organizations would conduct stability operations in the absence of the military. While this option is appropriate in a secure environment, it is not feasible for stability operations in a hostile environment. The very nature of a hostile environment would place civilians at risk to injury or death and prevent them from performing their mission.

The parallel military and civilian option means that there would be two separate operational headquarters for conducting stabilization operations; a civilian headquarters and a military headquarters. These headquarters would be required to coordinate with each other to synchronize their planning and execution. This option offers the professional expertise of

both military and civilians to carry out stability operations. The drawbacks are that coordination is more difficult than unity of command, the risk of duplication of effort, and the risk of working against each other in the event of poor coordination. This option can produce unity of effort but requires the daily interaction of both leaders and their staffs and assumes an excellent working relationship between the two. The establishment of a clear supported/supporting relationship could improve the effectiveness of this model, but never to the degree of an integrated model with a single leader. The case study of OIF demonstrates the challenges that this option presents to achieving unity of effort in the absence of unity of command.

The integrated with military lead option involves civilian field organizations under the operational control of the military commander. This option also brings to bare the professional expertise of both military and civilians to carry out stability operations. The principle advantage is that unity of command will enable unity of effort. Difficulties with this option are the possibility that civilian initiative may be stifled by the military, overcoming institutional inertia that favors peacetime bureaucratic stovepipes, and overcoming the American ideological aversion to placing civilians under military control. The CORDS program of the Vietnam War was initiated by the President and created a civilian operational deputy to the military commander and placed him in charge of a hybrid civil-military structure responsible for stability operations. CORDS demonstrated the effectiveness of this option in producing unity of effort and the ability of both civilian and military personnel to thrive in a hybrid organization. CORDS civilians actually became more powerful working within the military structure due to the resources that were now available

to them and overall civilian control of the military was always maintained by the President and Secretary of Defense.

The integrated with civilian lead option would place the military under the operational control of the civilian operational leader. This option utilizes both military and civilian expertise and produces unity of effort through unity of command. The drawback to this option is that the military plans and executes Phase III operations under an operational military commander. Making a civilian the operational commander in Phase IV does not solve the problem of unity of command across Phase III to Phase IV. The actions taken in Phase III will directly affect Phase IV and due to the nature of conflict termination, the military will always be the first available to carry out all aspects of stability operations. Because the issue is unity of effort across Phase III and Phase IV, not just Phase IV itself, this option has the same issues as the parallel military and civilian option.

## **Conclusions**

Planning and executing stability operations in a hostile environment is a complex and momentous task demanding a unique command and control model to achieve unity of effort across civilian and military organizations. Analysis of the five possible command and control models shows that three of them can work under certain conditions: The military only option requires a large and robust military civil affairs capability, the parallel military and civilian option requires that leaders are personally committed to cooperation and may be made more effective with a clear supported/supporting relationship, and the integrated with military lead option requires overcoming both institutional inertia and the ideological aversion to placing civilians under military control. Of these three, the latter in the form of a civilian deputy to the military operational commander is the most effective model for

stability operations in a hostile environment today. This idea is supported by history and by analysis of today's U.S. policy for stability operations.

Historical lessons from past stability operations support the argument for a civilian deputy. The critique of OIF clearly illustrates the difficulties with two parallel and co-equal headquarters that must use coordination as the means to achieve unity of effort. The examples of occupation of Nazi Germany and the Vietnam CORDS program demonstrate the effectiveness of a deputy (whether military or civilian) to a military operational commander. This deputy is focused on the planning and execution of stability operations and is empowered by a strong mandate and robust staff (whether military or hybrid mix of civilian and military).

Operating in a hostile environment is a game changer that trumps the peacetime status quo of institutional stovepipes. Peacetime seldom requires that multiple government institutions to take rapid and synchronized action at the operational level. Coordination is a sufficient means to achieving peacetime objectives in a reasonable amount of time. Conversely, when stability operations are taking place in a hostile environment, there is a constant threat to lives and property. This demands a command and control model that supports rapid and synchronized action across multiple activities: unity of command.

Effective stability operations in Phase IV requires unity of command across both Phase III and Phase IV. Combat operations in Phase III set the conditions for stability operations in Phase IV and winning the war requires success in Phase IV. Therefore winning the war requires that the plans for Phase III and Phase IV be aligned and complimentary. The most effective way to accomplish this is for a single leader to oversee the development of both plans – the military operational commander.

Today's realities warrant establishing the civilian deputy as the baseline command and control model for stability operations in a hostile environment at the operational level. Today's military does not possess the technical expertise across the political, economic, social, and justice dimensions to singlehandedly conduct stability operations. Civilian expertise is needed in addition to the existing military's civil affairs capabilities. The State Department's development of a civilian response and reserve capability could be used in sourcing a civil-military hybrid staff for stability operations. Establishing the policy now of a civilian operational deputy supported with a hybrid staff will support the continual planning by GCCDRs. Delaying this command and control decision could make interagency war gaming difficult.

### **Recommendations**

Establishing the command and control model of a civilian deputy to the military operational commander would require a National Security Presidential Directive with several actions. First, establish that this command and control model as the doctrinal baseline for stability operations in a hostile environment. Next, The Secretary of State via the S/CRS will assign a person of ambassadorial rank to each Geographic CCDR to support planning and war-gaming and be prepared to deploy in the event of a real world contingency. Finally, S/CRS and OSD(P) develop a manning document for a hybrid civil-military staff to support the civilian deputy and designate individuals to be prepared to support the planning and execution of stability operations.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> The White House. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, (Washington D.C.: The White House, 2006); The White House. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, (Washington D.C.: The White House, 2010).

<sup>2</sup> Thomas E. Ricks, *Fiasco*, (New York: The Penguin Press, 2006).

<sup>3</sup> *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction*, (Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace Press, 2009).

<sup>4</sup> Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Stability Operations*, final coordination, Joint Publication (JP) 3-07 (Washington, DC: CJCS, 22 April 2010), GL-11.

<sup>5</sup> David Kilcullen, Matt Porter and Carlos Burgos. *US Government Counterinsurgency Guide*. (United States Government, Interagency Counterinsurgency Initiative, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, 2009); U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-24, U.S. Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5. *Counterinsurgency*. (Washington DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, 2006); Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Stability Operations; Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction*.

<sup>6</sup> The Department of State is developing a civilian capability for stability operations with a Response Readiness Corps and a Civilian Reserve Corps. The Response Readiness Corps consists of existing U.S. government civilian employees that may be deployed by the Secretary of State to conduct stability operations. The Civilian Reserve Corps consists of volunteer U.S. citizens possessing skills useful to stability operations that may be called upon by the President under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. *Reconstruction and Stabilization Civilian Management Act of 2008*, H. R. 1084, 110<sup>th</sup> Cong., 2d sess., Congressional Report 110-537 (4 March 2008), 2-8.

<sup>7</sup> The Department of Defense Directive 3000.05 made stability operations a core mission of the military with priority comparable to combat operations. It also requires military plans for stability operations to be integrated with the plans of other U.S. Departments and Agencies and for these plans to be exercised and gamed. Department of Defense, *Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations*, Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 3000.05 (Washington DC: DoD, 28 November 2005), 2-3.

<sup>8</sup> The White House. National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD-44: Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization, (Washington DC: The White House, 7 Dec 2005), 2-5.

<sup>9</sup> Kenneth McCreedy, "Planning the Peace, Operation Eclipse and the Occupation of Germany," *Journal of Military History*, 65, (July 2001): 717-718.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid*, 717-718.

<sup>11</sup> Harry L. Coles and Albert K. Weinberg, "*U.S. Army in World War II: Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors*," (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1992) as cited in George Oliver, "Rebuilding Germany After World War II." Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2009, 5.

<sup>12</sup> Earl F. Ziemke, *Army Historical Series: The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany 1944-1946*, (Washington, DC.: Center of Military History, U.S. Army, 1990) as cited in George Oliver, "Rebuilding Germany After World War II." Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2009, 5.

<sup>13</sup> McCreedy, Planning the Peace, Operation Eclipse and the Occupation of Germany, 732-735.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid*, 721.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid*, 725-727.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid*, 732.

<sup>17</sup> George Oliver, "Rebuilding Germany After World War II." Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2009, 9.

<sup>18</sup> Oliver, Rebuilding Germany After World War II, 13-19.

<sup>19</sup> Douglas S. Blaufarb, *The Counter-Insurgency Era: U.S. Doctrine and Performance – 1950 to the Present* (New York: Free Press, 1977), 233.

<sup>20</sup> R. W. Komer, *Bureaucracy Does Its Thing: Institutional Constraints on U.S.-GVN Performance in Vietnam*, Santa Monica, CA: Rand, August 1972, viii-x.

<sup>21</sup> Blaufarb, 234, as cited in Richard Macak Jr, "*The CORDS Pacification Program: An Operational Level Campaign Plan in Low Intensity Conflict*," Ft Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 20 Dec 1989, 11.

<sup>22</sup> Blaufarb, 108-10; McCollum, 112; Robert W. Komer, "Clear, Hold and Rebuild," *Army* (June 1970), 19. As cited in Richard Macak Jr "*The CORDS Pacification Program*", 11-12.

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- <sup>23</sup> James K. McCollum, "The CORDS Pacification Organization in Vietnam: A Civil-Military Effort," *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol 10, No. 1, Fall 1983, 112-113. As cited in Richard Macak Jr "The CORDS Pacification Program", 14-15.
- <sup>24</sup> Robert Oakley and Michael Casey Jr. "The Country Team: Restructuring America's First Line of Engagement." *JFQ*, Issue 47, 4<sup>th</sup> quarter 2007, 148.
- <sup>25</sup> Frank Carlucci and Ian Brzezinski, "State Department Reform," Report of an Independent Task Force Cosponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations and the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2001, 9, available at [www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/state\\_department.pdf](http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/state_department.pdf). As cited in Oakley and Casey, "The Country Team", 148.
- <sup>26</sup> James J. Schneider, "Theoretical Paper No. 3", (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: SAMS, 1 March 1988), 17; McCollum, 116; As cited in Richard Macak Jr "The CORDS Pacification Program", 29-30.
- <sup>27</sup> Macak, "The CORDS Pacification Program", 26-35.
- <sup>28</sup> Blaufarb, The Counter-Insurgency Era, 270-71. As cited in Richard Macak Jr "The CORDS Pacification Program", 25.
- <sup>29</sup> *Hard lessons: the Iraq reconstruction experience*. (Washington, DC: Special Inspector General, Iraq Reconstruction), 2009, 333.
- <sup>30</sup> Donald P. Wright and Timothy R. Reese. *On Point II: the United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom, May 2003-January 2005: Transition to the New Campaign*. (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2008), 13-14.
- <sup>31</sup> Wright and Reese, *On Point*, 572.
- <sup>32</sup> Oakley and Casey, "The Country Team", 149.
- <sup>33</sup> Blake Stone. Blind Ambition: Lessons Learned and Not Learned in an Embedded PRT. *Prism I*, No. 4, 151-155.
- <sup>34</sup> Wright and Reese, *On Point*, 573

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